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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Traditionally, unions have exercised their economic power through the strike and the boycott to 
gain collective bargaining agreements and through the day-to-day enforcement of contract provisions. But 
the rapidly growing mobility of capital and the increased rate of introducing new technologies have 
increasingly neutralized the effectiveness of labor's fundamental tools. 
Thus, it is crucial that unions begin to develop new tools to enhance the economic power of workers. This 
means that labor must redefine its role with respect to the economy and to the process of allocating 
resources in the society. Increasingly, unions are demanding plant closing protections, a voice in the 
introduction of new technologies, restrictions on subcontracting, commitments for reinvestment in 
existing facilities, and job security for current workers. 
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Breaking 
New Ground: 
Pension Fund Bargaining 
at Eastern 
by Randy Barber 
Traditionally, unions have exercised their economic power through 
the strike and the boycott to gain collective bargaining agreeements 
and through the day-to-day enforcement of contract provisions. But 
the rapidly growing mobility of capital and the increased rate of 
introducing new technologies have increasingly neutralized the 
effectiveness of labor's fundamental tools. 
Thus, it is crucial that unions begin to develop new tools to enhance 
the economic power of workers. This means that labor must redefine 
its role with respect to the economy and to the process of allocating 
resources in the society. Increasingly, unions are demanding plant 
closing protections, a voice in the introduction of new technologies, 
restrictions on subcontracting, commitments for reinvestment in 
existing facilities, and job security for current workers. 
These and other demands are crucial for the protection of workers 
and their families. But they are far from enough. If labor is to 
effectively promote the economic power of workers, it must become 
directly involved in an area which has always been defined as a 
management or corporate perogative: the process of making invest-
ment decisions. Otherwise, companies will always be able to 
undermine any gains workers make simply by moving away from 
them or replacing them—to say nothing of their ability to resist 
worker demands in the first place. 
Randy Barber is the director of the Center for Economic Organizing 
in Washington, D.C., which works with labor unions on issues of 
investment and control of pension funds. 
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Workers have a potential tool which could allow them to force their 
way into the invesment decision-making process: the pension fund. 
Late in 1983, the total value of pension funds will top $1 trillion. 
Collectively, they represent the largest pool of capital—or money— 
in the world. Pension funds are the deferred wages of 50 million 
American workers, and they are the major form of personal savings 
for most of those workers. They own between 20 and 25 percent of 
corporate stock and 40 percent of corporate bonds. Pension funds 
will inject almost 100 billion new dollars into the economy this year— 
that represents about one-third of all the new investments that will 
be made. Most experts predict that these massive funds will own 
over half of all corporate stock by the turn of the century and will 
be by far the most powerful financial institution in the world. 
There are three general categories of pension funds: public 
employee funds for state and local government workers; single-
employer funds for workers mostly in manufacturing, service, high 
technology and utility firms; and multi-employer funds for workers 
in such industries as construction, transportation, retail, textile and 
clothing, and mining. Unions have joint control with management 
in the multi-employer funds. Unions often have some form of 
representation on public employee fund boards of trustees, although 
this varies widely, even within the same state or locality. With few 
exceptions, however, unions have no voice in the administration and 
investment of negotiated, single-employer funds. Public employee 
funds have assets in excess of $300 billion. Jointly controlled funds 
have over $75 billion, and single-employer funds have more than $625 
billion. Over half of the single-employer funds, in terms of assets, 
are subject to collective bargaining, but companies normally insist 
on retaining all aspects of the control of these funds. 
Whether or not there is union representation on their boards of 
trustees, most pension funds turn their assets over to financial 
institutions such as banks, insurance companies or independent 
money managers. These managers usually invest pension assets in 
the stocks and bonds of the largest corporations and in those newer 
"high tech" companies which, it is hoped, will become the "IBMs 
of the future." Although professional pension fund managers are paid 
large fees for their investment services, they have consistently 
underperformed the broad market averages. 
Over the past half dozen years, unions and others have become 
increasingly aware of the incredible economic power that resides in 
workers' pension funds. They have learned that pension funds not 
only receive mediocre returns at best, but that they also invest heavily 
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in anti-union companies, in multinational corporations that are 
exporting jobs and production to low-wages areas in the country and 
abroad, and in many other ways which undermine the current 
economic interests of workers. 
Many union bodies—from the local to the national level—have 
adopted resolutions calling for increased labor control over the 
investments of these funds. The AFLrCIO Executive Council, in 1980, 
established four broad policy goals for union participation in pension 
fund management. 
1 "To increase employment through reindustrialization 
including manufacturing, construction, transportation, 
maritime and other sectors necessary to revitalize the 
economy. 
2) 'To advance social purposes such as workers' housing and 
health centers. 
3) "To improve the ability of workers to exercise their rights 
as shareholders in a coordinated fashion. 
4) "To exclude from union pension plan investment 
portfolios of companies whose policies are hostile to 
workers' rights." 
In that same years, the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department 
(IUD) issued a series of recommendations for unions to pursue in 
negotiations for joint control of pension funds. These recommenda-
tions included a list of information and documents which unions 
should demand. They also outlined a range of alternatives short of 
joint control which, while not sufficient, could give unions greater 
leverage with the investment and administration of negotiated funds. 
The following year, the IUD began publishing a monthly newsletter, 
Labor & Investments, to assist unions in the task of gaining greater 
control over pension funds and to report on major developments 
in the area. This publication is available to all union members whose 
organizations are affiliated with the IUD. 
Also during 1980, the AFL-CIO Building and Contrcution Trades 
Department (BCTD) began a series of training and education pro-
grams for the pension fund trustees of its affiliates. These unions 
are almost exclusively involved in jointly controlled pension funds. 
The focus of these programs was quite specific: how can trustees 
of these funds legally invest in union-built structures, the construc-
tion of which will provide jobs to member-participants? There are 
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dozens of examples throughout the country of how construction-
related pension funds have made such investments, and the BCTD's 
on-going training program is designed to make other trustees aware 
of them. 
A growing number of local to international unions and their related 
pension funds have begun their own investment programs, usually 
concentrating on ways to stabilize employment in their industry. To 
date, this has primarily involved the construction and maritime 
industries, but there are unions in several other industries which 
are exploring new job-creating investment ideas. 
Unions have also become aware of the potential uses of pension 
funds in another way: to exert pressure on corporations and their 
financial supporters. Pension funds, which together often own as 
much as half the stock of a company, can be a potent tool in con-
vincing corporations to deal fairly with their workers. 
Many public employee pension funds have begun to make 
"targeted" investments for housing and employment in their 
localities. During 1982, public funds made at least $2 billion in such 
investments. Recently, representatives from public employee funds 
and from jointly-trusted funds have, in several states, started to 
discuss cooperative efforts to increase the amount of pension capital 
that is "recycled" into the communities where pension participants 
live and work. Public employee funds have also been increasingly 
supportive of activist-sponsored shareholder resolutions, including 
union-supported resolutions designed to put pressure on companies 
with labor disputes. 
In spite of many encouraging developments in the alternative 
investment of pension funds, the priority for most workers and their 
unions must first be to gain some measure of control. Without that 
control, and responsibility, very little can be done to alter the ways 
in which pension funds are currently being invested. 
Further, as we will see in the case of Eastern Air Lines, there are 
many issues beyond investments which make it important for unions 
to demand joint control of pension funds. In almost all single 
employer funds (as well as in most public funds), the employer 
unilaterally controls the benefit administration, the accounting and 
bookkeeping, and many crucial assumptions that are used to deter-
mine the amount that companies must contribute to funds each year. 
Many troubled corporations have used this control to manipulate 
their funds in such a way as to significantly reduce their contribu-
tions. There is also a growing trend of companies "terminating" 
pension plans and taking back large sums which they claim are 
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In the following sections, this article will describe a process that 
led to partially successful demands for joint control of one pension 
fund at Eastern. The reader should keep in mind that there were 
many, intertwined factors that contributed both to the IAM's interest 
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in more control over their fund and to their ability to make a serious 
demand on the company. 
Researching the Fund and Demanding Information 
Like many large corporations, Eastern Air Lines "sponsors" a 
number of separate pension plans for different categories of workers. 
EAL maintains thirteen plans, with cumulative assets in excess of 
$1 billion. Until 1982, these funds were "comingled—all of their assets 
were kept together in one pool—and managed by Prudential Life 
Insurance Company and Equitable Life Assurance Society, two of 
the largest pension managers in the world. 
LAM District 100 negotiates with Eastern over several plans, by far 
the largest of which is the $160 million plan for Mechanic and Related 
Personnel. 
The union began seriously researching the Eastern fund more than 
a year before the expiration of the contract on December 31, 1981. 
Marty Urra, who would soon become president of Local Lodge 702 
in Miami, conducted the initial research. Urra was initially concerned 
over reports that the Eastern fund was receiving a poor return on 
its investments, that the companies managing the fund had poor 
relations with unions, and that the benefit formula for the plan was 
not as generous as it could be. 
Urra was outraged when he learned that Prudential, which 
manages the bulk of the Eastern funds, had financed the construc-
tion of the new National Right-to-Work Committee headquarters 
building. Since the Machinists had no control over the selection of 
investment managers, Urra knew that there was nothing he could 
do immediately. But he decided to begin an in-depth examination 
of the Eastern funds. 
Urra obtained, from the company, copies of a required annual 
federal filing, known as the "5500 Form," for all of Eastern's pension 
funds. This form, along with voluminous attachments, is a public 
document and can be obtained independently from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (Office of Plant Reports and Disclosure, Labor-
Management Services Administration). It contains a wealth of 
detailed information about a plan's investment and administration. 
Soon after beginning his research, Urra learned of press reports 
that Eastern had manipulated a key calculation used to determine 
the contributions it would have to make to its pension plans. This 
calculation is known as the "actuarial interest assumption." This 
assumption establishes the rate of return that it is anticipated the 
pension fund will receive on its investments in the future. This is 
a crucial 
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The more a fund's assets earn, the less a company has to contribute 
or the more benefit levels can be increased. On the other hand, if 
it is assumed that a fund will have relatively low earnings, the 
company must contribute more in order to fund the same level of 
benefits. While they obviously do not guarantee any particular rate 
of return, interest assumptions are the linch-pin in determining the 
contributions which are required to ensure that a pension plan is 
funded on an actuarily sound basis. 
In early 1981, EAL changed its interest assumptions from 7 percent 
to 9 percent, at a time when the company was under heavy financial 
pressure. In analyzing company documents, Urra found that the 
interest assumption change had saved Eastern more than $23 million 
for 1981 alone. 
Further, Urra found that while Eastern contributed about $14 
million in 1980 for the IAM plan, or over $1,000 per active employee, 
in 1981 the company contributed only $8.5 million, or about $650 
per active worker. With the stroke of a pen, Eastern saved itself 
millions of dollars in benefit payments even though the Machinists 
had negotiated benefit levels on the basis of the total pension costs 
to the company. According to the union, it gave up other potential 
benefits in exchange for pension benefit increases on the basis of 
the 7 percent interest calculation. 
The union not only felt betrayed, it became even more suspicious 
of Eastern's stewardship of their negotiated deferred wages. Urra, 
who by then had become president of Local Lodge 702, was asked 
by District 100 president Charles Bryan to form a research committee 
to help prepare for the impending negotiations. 
In August 1981, Bryan formally requested a large number of 
pension-related documents from Eastern as part of its demands for 
bargaining information. Under labor law, companies are required to 
supply unions with this information. Among the documents 
requested were: 
• the most recent filing of Eastern's 5500 Form, all 
supporting material and Form 5500B, which contains 
detailed actuarial information and records of contributions 
to the fund; 
• the latest financial and investment performance reports 
provided by the fund's investment managers, covering the 
previous five years; 
• all contracts with the investment managers; 
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• all correspondence among the fund, its investment 
managers and fund consultants; 
• investment performance comparisons conducted by 
independent evaluation services; 
• reports from the fund's acturaries and accounting firms; 
and 
• all internal Eastern correspondence relating to the 
investment and administration of the fund. 
For the most part, Eastern complied with this request, and Urra 
began wading through a foot-thick pile of documents. No sooner 
had he started this process than he noticed another alarming action 
the company had taken. During 1980, Eastern had "reallocated" over 
$4 million in assets from the Machinists' and other plans into those 
of the pilots and one other. This was particularly disturbing since 
the pilots' plan was, according to EAL's own documents, substantially 
better funded than the IAM plan. Later the company would claim 
that this reallocation was completely legal and was done for tax 
purposes, producing no real impact on any of the plans. Whatever 
the reason, more seeds of suspicion were sown among the 
Machinists. Combined with the growing distrust of Eastern's financial 
manipulations engendered by the VEP, this convinced the union that 
it was crucial to secure a role in the investment and administration 
of their negotiated plan. 
Moreover, Urra and his research team were convinced that they 
could do at least as good a job of investing and administering the 
fund as Eastern had. "We have a $400 million credit union right across 
the street from our local," says Urra. "For a number of years, IAM 
members have been deeply involved in managing our credit union 
and we have become convinced that we can prudently become 
involved in managing our pension money as well. Good financial 
management is really no mystery, and we know that we can do a 
good job." 
The Initial Demands for Joint Control 
In December 1981, the IAM negotiating committee had a five-hour 
session with Eastern at which it presented a demand for joint control 
of the Mechanics and Related Fund. The union's proposal included 
a 12-point plan detailing how a new jointly-administered plan would 
be established and managed. In addition, it contained two demands 
for investment-related benefits for participants in the plan. The major 
provisions of the IAM demand included: 
• The establ 
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The establishment of a completely separate IAM- Eastern 
Joint Pension Plan "for the purposes of administration, 
investment and the provision of benefits." 
Three union and three company trustees, each side 
casting one aggregate vote, on a Board of Trustees which 
"shall have the final authority to make all determinations 
about the eligibility for benefits, investment managers and 
other factors relating to the operation of the plan." 
Included in this authority would be the right to establish 
or change any assumption or procedure and the right to 
"select, approve, terminate or replace" any investment 
manager or consultant. 
The offices of the fund would be maintained separately 
from those of the union or the company, with a fund 
administrator appointed jointly by the trustees. In 
addition, each side would have the right to hire an 
assistant administrator who would be solely responsible 
to that side and who would have access to all informa-
tion concerning the plan. 
Arbitration in the event of a deadlock or the inability of 
the Board of Trustees to reach a decision. 
Joint actuaries, one appointed by the union trustees and 
one appointed by the company trustees. The actuaries 
together would be required to "make recommendations 
to the trustees on all actuarial issues affecting the plan, 
including, but not being limited to, interest assumptions, 
wage and salary assumptions, and required employer 
contributions for the plan year." In the event that the joint 
actuaries could not reach an agreement, a third actuary, 
acceptable to both sides, would be retained to reach a final 
decision. 
As a one-time measure, at the creation of the separated 
plan, the union trustees would have the right to decide 
whether to retain or dismiss current investment managers. 
If they decided to dismiss them, the selection of new 
managers would be performed by the entire board. 
Also as a one-time measure, the union trustees would be 
empowered to retain an independent investment advisor 
to review the current investment managers and all invest-
ment procedures of the fund. 
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• The establishment of a stockvoting committee to explore 
the practices of current investment managers and to 
discuss the pass-through of stock voting rights of plan 
holdings. 
• The dedication of at least 25 percent of new contributions 
and investment income into the plan "for loans to plan 
participants and beneficiaries for mortgages, home 
improvement loans, consumer and automobile loans and 
so forth." Consideration would be given to having the 
Eastern Air Lines Employees Federal Credit Union 
perform the lending paperwork functions for the pension 
plan. 
• Offering to retirees the "option of guaranteed lifetime 
housing in lieu of a portion of cash benefits." This would 
be accomplished by having the plan construct housing 
units for this purpose and calculating its cost on an 
actuarial basis for offering the option. Such a cost, spread 
over the expected lifetime of retirees, would be deducted 
from cash payments, if a retiree chose the option. 
The IAM proposals were designed to guarantee that a new jointly-
trusteed pension fund would be in fact jointly controlled. One of 
the major problems union trustees have is that they are not trained 
in benefit administration and investment procedures. Thus, it is not 
unusual to find either the professional staff or the management 
trustees dominating funds on which union representatives serve. By 
separating the plan, moving it away from Eastern headquarters, 
creating an independent fund staff, giving the union trustees their 
own assistant administrator, and allowing them to independently 
examine the status quo for the plan, the union hoped to achieve an 
effective and equal voice on the board of trustees. 
Eastern's response to the proposal was one of disbelief. After 
reading the three-page series of demands, the lead Eastern negotiator 
called for a caucus. Returning in about a half an hour, the EAL 
negotiators laboriously moved through the elements of the proposal, 
obviously attempting to intimidate the union team with highly 
technical comments and questions. To their surprise the Eastern team 
found the union knew at least as much about the fund as they did. 
Urra and several others were not only able to respond to company 
queries, they were also able to ask some pretty tough questions 
themselves. 
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At one point, an Eastern negotiator asked if it was legal for the 
union to have joint control. Someone on the union team responded: 
"Not only is it legal and common in many industries, but Taft-
Hartley's requirement that union representation be limited to, at 
most, one half of the trustees doesn't apply to the airline industry, 
which is under the Railway Labor Act. Under the law, the LAM could 
completely control this fund, but we thought we'd come in with a 
moderate demand this time." 
Last Minute Pension Proposals 
and New Contract Language 
Over the next year, as negotiations dragged on, little progress was 
made on bargaining over control of the pension fund. Then, in early 
1983, Eastern dropped another pension-related bombshell: it 
disclosed to the union that, as of December 31, 1981, it had 
"uncommingled" the pension funds it maintains and was operating 
them as completely separate plans with individual asset pools. "I 
was dumbfounded," commented District 100 president Bryan. "Here 
it was, February 1983, and the company was finally getting around 
to telling us that it had separated the plans more than a year before. 
In fact, the letter from the actuaries to Eastern meekly suggested that 
'at some point, I.A.M. and other groups must be told about 
uncommingling.' " 
Bryan says that he and the negotiating committee were not 
displeased that the funds had been uncommingled. "Frankly, 
uncommingling was a precondition to joint control or even partial 
control of the fund. But the way the company carried it out—secretly 
and without informing us—was just another reason for us to press 
for a role in investing and administrating our plan," he says. "With 
the funds uncommingled," he continues, "we felt we had a good 
shot at some sort of increased involvement in the plan." 
On the day that Eastern and the union reached a contract 
agreement, hours short of a strike deadline, the company agreed, 
in principle, to two union trustees and to the creation of a board of 
trustees for the LAM plan. Unfortunately, while the union presented 
"ready-to-sign" contract language, the final details of the agreement 
were put off until later, when several technical points in the contract 
were to be ironed out. Several key pension issues were left 
unresolved, including the total number of trustees, the actual powers 
of the board, and the authority of individual trustees. 
The language the union presented was, in fact, a formalization of 
major elements in its earlier joint control proposal. It contained five 
sections which would accomplish the following: 
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Section I. The Composition and Operation of the Pension 
Board: There would be four trustees, two from each side. 
The trustees would vote individually and three votes 
would be required to carry a motion. 
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• Section II. The Powers of the Board: The board would be 
given full authority over the administration and invest-
ment of the fund, except that it could not alter any terms 
of the plan determined through collective bargaining. 
• Section III. The Rights and Duties of the Board: This 
section repeats, in more detail, the complete authority of 
the board, including the selection or removal of all 
consultants, advisors, investment managers and actuaries. 
• Section IV. Dispute Resolution: In the event of a deadlock, 
mediation and then arbitration would be invoked. 
• Section V. Modification of Plan Documents: This section 
requires Eastern to file the appropriate modifications of 
the pension plan's legal trust documents, as required (with 
the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Department of 
Labor). 
In the weeks following the settlement, it became clear that Eastern 
had no intention of agreeing to full joint control of the fund. As an 
alternative, the union then proposed a "permanent neutral trustee," 
who would serve as a tie-breaker. But this too was rejected. The 
company, while acknowledging that it had agreed to two union 
trustees, demanded that there be a total of seven trustees, giving the 
company a five-to-two edge. Since it was clear that full joint control 
was not going to be achieved, the union held out for a total of five 
trustees. 
The Tentative lAM-Eastern Pension Agreement: 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
After months of stalling, Eastern finally presented the union with 
its proposed contract language for a "pension trust commitee," 
comprised of five "members." The trust committee, which is 
essentially the same thing as a board of trustees, was given many 
of the same powers as proposed by the LAM. 
However, there were some significant exceptions. Beyond the three-
to-two split in favor of the company, the major difference lies in the 
continued role given to Eastern directly, as opposed to Eastern 
through its committee members, or trustees. The company is still 
empowered to enter into written agreements for investment and other 
services, subject to the approval of the trust committee. In addition, 
the lawyers, accountants, actuaries and other professional advisors 
for the plan will continue to be employees of Eastern, not of the trust 
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directly. Although the trust coitimittee does have the final fiduciary 
powers and responsibilities, the power to initiate actions and enter 
into agreements is shared with the company. While this may be a 
fine legal—as well as practical—distinction, it detracts from the 
concept that the fund should be autonomous from the company, even 
if Eastern appointees dominate the trust committee. 
At this writing, the IAM has yet to respond to the proposed 
language, and subsequent events may significantly alter the final 
outcome. However, Eastern's proposed language is likely to be 
implemented in other companies as a "halfway" measure towards 
joint control of pension funds. Because of this, it is valuable to 
examine what Eastern agreed to. 
Below is a summary of the major points in the company's proposed 
language. Comments in italics are the author's observations on the 
strengths and weaknesses of various provisions: 
• The Pension Trust Committee will have five members, 
three appointed by Eastern and two by the union. Eastern 
and the union may replace or substitute any of the 
members at any time. Each side will be responsible for 
payment of travel and other expenses incurred by trust 
committee members. Obviously, the three-to-two split will 
place the union members in the position of a permanent 
minority. They will however, have access to much more 
information than they ever had before, and will much 
more completely understand all moves made with respect 
to the investment and administration of the fund. This 
observer believes that reimbursement of trust committee 
members should come from the fund, not from the 
respective sides. Clearly, Eastern is much more able to 
reimburse its members than is the union. Many pension 
funds pay the expenses of their trustees out of assets; this 
would amount to an extremely small sum in comparison 
with the $160 million for which the trust committee is 
responsible. 
• "For administrative convenience only," the committee will 
select a Chair and Vice Chair, one from Eastern and one 
from the union. A majority of the members that includes 
at least one union member will constitute a quorum. 
Clearly, the Chair can be expected to be from the company, 
which gives it the advantage of being able to call meetings, 
set agendas, and control the flow of information. However, 
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the trust committee will not be able to meet or carry out 
any formal business without the presence of at least one 
of the union members. 
The assets of the plan will be held by a custodian—or 
master trustee—which will be a nationally-recognized 
bank, "pursuant to written trust agreement with Eastern 
approved by the Committee." The plan's assets will be 
delegated to one or more investment managers, 
employed, again, "pursuant to written agreements with 
Eastern approved by the Committee." However, the 
committee will have the power to "select, appoint, remove 
and replace the investment managers.. .in accordance 
with such procedures and standards as the Committee 
may establish." Further, the trust committee will be able 
to establish investment guidelines, and allocate assets 
among the investment managers. The committee may not 
directly manage or invest plan assets; it must turn them 
over to investment managers for such tasks. The trust 
committee is given the basic responsibilities and powers 
of a standard board of trustees, with the exception that 
Eastern can enter into written agreements, which the 
committee can either approve or reject. While the union 
will clearly not be able to have its way with respect to 
investments, the precedent has been set at Eastern for a 
formally (at least) independent pension trust committee. 
The committee will be empowered to "request and receive 
from Eastern, the Union, its members, any trustee and 
any investment manager such information as may be 
needful in the performance of the Committee's duties." 
The committee will be entitled to receive and rely upon 
the advice given by pension and other professionals in 
the employ of Eastern. Further, the committee may 
"employ its own professional advisors and consultants, 
such as, but not limited to, actuaries, accountants and legal 
counsel. The cost of any such outside advisors or 
consultants shall be born equally by Eastern and the 
Union." And the committee will make recommendations 
to the company and the union for improvement of the 
plan. While the committee is given broad powers to obtain 
information, it will be quite dependent on the company 
for this information, as well as the interpretation of it. 
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Also, it is not clear what types of information the union 
committee members can demand without the approval 
of the Eastern members. Further, by having the cost of 
outside consultants and advisors equally borne by Eastern 
and the 1AM, the union is placed in yet another potential 
financial bind with respect to adequate oversight of the 
fund. Normally, such costs are borne by a plan as part 
of its normal operational expenses. 
It would be easy to second-guess the pension negotiation process 
between EAL and the Machinists. Clearly, the fact that the agreement 
was not set in contractual concrete at the time the overall agreement 
was reached significantly reduced the leverage the union had. But 
it was only on the very last day of bargaining that the company 
indicated a willingness to concede anything, and the pressure for 
finalizing the main agreement was overwhelming. 
Although there appeared to be strong support from the rank- and-
file for the joint control demand, it was obviously not the central 
issue. The momentum of collective bargaining militated against 
holding out for a finalized pension trust agreement. 
It is quite clear, however, that IAM District 100 accomplished a 
major task: by getting a "foot in the door" of the trust committee, 
it established a precedent for further negotiations at Eastern. The 
IAM had also set a pattern which can be used by other unions in 
negotiations over joint control. 
Conclusion 
It is both easy and extremely difficult to draw general conclusions 
from the Machinists' experience at Eastern. The most important 
general conclusion relates to the central importance of advance 
preparation and in-depth research. Without a thorough 
understanding of the plan, the union might not have been able to 
take advantage of the information it uncovered concerning company 
manipulation of the fund. 
The research team, which was drawn both from officers and the 
rank-and-file, was able to develop impressive skills in a relatively 
short time. And they were able to communicate their findings to a 
large number of union members, the media, and, importantly, to 
Eastern itself. It is clear that the IAM's research and education efforts 
were key to the union's ability to effectively deal with Eastern on all 
levels. While consultants were used, the research team did most of 
the work i 
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The most important lesson for this author from the pension 
research and bargaining at Eastern is this: the administration and 
investment of a fund is completely intertwined. If negotiators ignore 
any element of a company's control over a pension fund, they will 
not see the whole picture, and they will probably not be as effective 
as they could be in responding to company assertions. 
Control over investments is a new, and important, direction for 
labor. But control over the administration of benefits and over the 
funding of a plan is equally important. The IAM was concerned with 
the entire operation of their negotiated fund, and were, thus, able 
to achieve much more than any of us who were initially involved 
would have predicted. Negotiations of this sort require a long-term 
view; the benefits of joint control will not be immediately felt and 
they will not translate directly into workers' paychecks. Further/it 
will probably take several rounds of bargaining to secure equal control 
of these funds, even if the union makes it a major priority. Companies 
are not likely to easily give up control of assets which are often as 
large as the net worth of the corporation itself. 
There is a real question, as well, whether joint control should even 
be an issue in bargaining: since Taft-Hartley requires unions to give 
management at least joint control, why shouldn't joint control be 
mandated for all funds? By law, pension fund assets represent the 
deferred wages of participants and beneficiaries; they do not belong 
to the sponsoring employer. But, as we have seen, in the majority 
of cases, the sponsor controls the trust unilaterally, even though the 
assets of the fund typically represent the largest form of savings the 
participant "owns." 
At the very least, participants or their representative should have 
a legal right to an equal voice on their pension fund's board of 
trustees. Recognizing that there is a broad diversity of arrangements 
with pension and other benefit plans, Congress could enact a law 
that would be flexible, allowing for a range of options depending 
on the situation. Where a single union has negotiated a plan with 
an employer, the employer could appoint half of the trustees and 
the union could either appoint or elect the other half. Where several 
unions are involved, a procedure could be devised where, 
proportional to their membership covered by the plan, they would 
among themselves designate or elect the employee trustees. Where 
no union exists, a simple, periodic election procedure could be 
established to allow participants to select their representatives for 
92 UP AGAINST the GLOOM and DOOM! 
pension fund boards of trustees. 
It will clearly be years, if ever, before such legislation is enacted. 
In the meantime, unions will have to negotiate for more control. 
However difficult such negotiations may be, they are an absolutely 
vital precondition for unions to effectively represent the interests of 
their members. And, as the LAM learned, the very fact that they 
aggressively pursued this strategy gave them new insights into the 
operation of the company and allowed them to develop yet another 
tool to keep the company off balance and on the defensive. 
Joint control of pension funds is not a solution to the many 
problems that beset labor, but it can provide unions with an 
incredibly powerful new tool. Not insignificantly, it can also help 
provide union negotiators with a more in-depth understanding of 
the range of financial manipulations in which corporations are 
engaged. 
Even when a substantial portion of the $1 trillion in pension assets 
is brought under effective joint union control, the real challenge will 
lie ahead. At that point, labor will have to seriously ask the question: 
How should the deferred wages of workers really be invested? What 
role can and should unions play in ensuring that these assets are 
properly invested? 
The answers to these questions will inevitably carry unions far 
beyond issues of hours and working conditions. The real challenge 
will be to continue these fundamental union functions while, at the 
same time, effectively pursuing new directions that take labor deep 
into the heart of traditional management territory. • 
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